![]() The first issue to tackle is getting a malicious assembly planted in such a way that the service will try to load it. ![]() For efficient exploitation, it is important to fully understand the conditions in which an assembly can be loaded successfully. Additionally, the service implements some checks that must be passed before the assembly can be loaded. This approach came with some complications, such as a race condition to replace an assembly before the service loads it. ![]() NET assembly with a malicious one, reboot the system and let the Razer Synapse Service load it when it starts. In theory, an attacker could simply replace an existing. When looking at the DACL on the folder “C:\ProgramData\Razer\Synapse3\Service\bin”, you will notice that “Everyone” has “FullControl” rights over the folder (including any files within the folder): NET assemblies out of various directories within “C:\ProgramData\Razer\*”, such as “C:\ProgramData\Razer\Synapse3\Service\bin”. When the Razer Synapse service starts, it will load. It is possible to circumvent signing checks and elevate to SYSTEM using assembly sideloading. The folder “ C:\ProgramData\Razer\*” and recursive directories/files have weak permissions that grant any authenticated user FullControl over the contents. NET assemblies from “C:\ProgramData\Razer\*”. Vulnerability: Razer Synapse Windows Service EoPīrief Description: The Razer Synapse software has a service (Razer Synapse Service) that runs as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM” and loads multiple. ![]() Product Version: Razer Synapse 3 (.112711) Windows Client
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